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Abstract
Debunking misinformation is an important and
time-critical task as there could be adverse
consequences when misinformation is not
quashed promptly. However, the usual super-
vised approach to debunking via misinforma-
tion classification requires human-annotated
data and is not suited to the fast time-frame of
newly emerging events such as the COVID-19
outbreak. In this paper, we postulate that mis-
information itself has higher perplexity com-
pared to truthful statements, and propose to
leverage the perplexity to debunk false claims
in an unsupervised manner. First, we ex-
tract reliable evidence from scientific and news
sources according to sentence similarity to the
claims. Second, we prime a language model
with the extracted evidence and finally evalu-
ate the correctness of given claims based on
the perplexity scores at debunking time. We
construct two new COVID-19-related test sets,
one is scientific, and another is political in con-
tent, and empirically verify that our system
performs favorably compared to existing sys-
tems. We are releasing these datasets1 publicly
to encourage more research in debunking mis-
information on COVID-19 and other topics.
1 Introduction
Debunking misinformation is a process of expos-
ing the falseness of given claims based on relevant
evidence. The failure to debunk misinformation
in a timely manner can result in catastrophic con-
sequences, as illustrated by the recent death of a
man who tried to self-medicate with chloroquine
phosphate to prevent COVID-19 (Vigdor, 2020).
Amid the COVID-19 pandemic and infodemic, the
need for an automatic debunking system has never
been more dire.
∗ These two authors contributed equally.
1https://github.com/HLTCHKUST/covid19-misinfo-data
...
Figure 1: Proposed approach of using the language
model (LM) as a debunker. We prime an LM with ex-
tracted evidence relevant to the whole set of claims, and
then we compute the perplexities during the debunking
stage.
A lack of data is the major obstacle for de-
bunking misinformation related to newly emerged
events like the COVID-19 pandemic. There are
no labeled data available to adopt supervised deep-
learning approaches (Etzioni et al., 2008; Wu et al.,
2014; Ciampaglia et al., 2015; Popat et al., 2018;
Alhindi et al., 2018), and an insufficient amount
of social- or meta-data to apply feature-based ap-
proaches (Long et al., 2017; Karimi et al., 2018;
Kirilin and Strube, 2018). To overcome this bot-
tleneck, we propose an unsupervised approach of
using a large language model (LM) as a debunker.
Misinformation is a piece of text that contains
false information regarding its subject, resulting in
a rare co-occurrence of the subject and its neighbor-
ing words in a truthful corpus. When a language
model primed with truthful knowledge is asked to
reconstruct the missing words in a claim, such as
“5G communication spreads ... ”, it would predict
word “information” with the highest probability
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(7 × 10−1). On the other hand, it would predict
the word ”Covid-19” in a false claim such as “5G
communication spreads COVID-19” with very low
probability (i.e., 2× 10−4). It follows that truthful
statements would give low perplexity whereas false
claims tend to have high perplexity, when scored
by a truth-grounded language model. Since per-
plexity is a score for quantifying the likelihood of
a given sentence based on previously encountered
distribution, we propose a novel interpretation of
perplexity as a degree of falseness.
To further address the problem of data scarcity,
we leverage the large pre-trained LM, such as GPT-
2 (Radford et al., 2019), which are shown to be
helpful in a low-resource setting by allowing the
transfer learning of features learned from their huge
training corpus (Devlin et al., 2018; Radford et al.,
2018; Liu et al., 2019; Lewis et al., 2019). It is
also illustrated the potential of LMs in learning
useful knowledge without any explicit task-specific
supervision to perform well on tasks such as ques-
tion answering and summarization (Radford et al.,
2019; Petroni et al., 2019).
Moreover, it is crucial to ensure that the LM is
populated with “relevant and clean evidence” be-
fore assessing the claims, especially when these are
related to newly emerging events. There are two
main ways of obtaining evidence in fact-checking
tasks. One way is to rely on evidence from the
structured knowledge base such as Wikipedia and
knowledge-graph (Wu et al., 2014; Ciampaglia
et al., 2015; Thorne et al., 2018; Yoneda et al.,
2018a; Nie et al., 2019). Another approach is to
obtain evidence directly from unstructured data on-
line (Etzioni et al., 2008; Magdy and Wanas, 2010).
However, the former approach faces a challenge in
maintaining up-to-date knowledge, making it vul-
nerable to unprecedented outbreaks. On the other
hand, the latter approach suffers from the credibil-
ity issue and the noise of the evidence. In our work,
we attempt to combine the best of both worlds in
the evidence selection step by extracting evidence
from unstructured-data and ensuring quality by fil-
tering noise.
The contribution of our work is threefold. First,
we propose a novel dimension of using language
model perplexity to debunk false claims, as illus-
trated in Figure 1. It is not only data efficient but
also achieves promising results comparable to su-
pervised baseline models. We also carry out quali-
tative analysis to understand the optimal ways of
exploiting perplexity as a debunker. Second, we
present an additional evidence-filtering step to im-
prove the evidence quality, which consequentially
improves the overall debunking performance. Fi-
nally, we construct and release two new COVID-
19-pandemic-related debunking test sets.
2 Motivation
Language Modeling Given a sequence of tokens
X = {x0, · · · , xn}, language models are trained
to compute the probability of the sequence p(X).
This probability is factorized as a product of con-
ditional probability by applying the chain rules
(Manning et al., 1999; Bengio et al., 2003):
p(X) =
n∏
i=1
p(xi|x0, · · · , xi−1) (1)
In recent years, large transformer-based (Vaswani
et al., 2017) language models have been trained to
minimize the negative log-likelihood over a large
collection of documents.
Leveraging Perplexity Perplexity, a commonly
used metric for measuring the performance of an
LM, is defined as the inverse of the probability of
the test set normalized by the number of words:
PPL(X) = n
√√√√ n∏
i=1
1
p(xi|x0, · · · , xi−1) (2)
Another way of interpreting perplexity is the mea-
sure of the likelihood of a given test sentence in
reference to the training corpus. Based on this
intuition, we hypothesize the following:
“When a language model is primed with
a collection of relevant evidence about
given claims, the perplexity can serve as
an indicator for falseness.”
The rationale behind is that the extracted evi-
dence sentences for a True claim would share
more similarities (e.g., common terms or syn-
onyms) with its associated claim. This leads to
True claims to have lower perplexity while the
False claims remain having higher perplexity.
3 Methodology
Task Definition Debunking is the task of expos-
ing the falseness of a given claim by extracting
relevant evidence and verifying the claims upon it.
False Claims Perplexity
Ordering or buying products shipped from overseas will make a person get COVID-19. 556.2
Sunlight actually can kill the novel COVID-19. 385.0
5G helps COVID-19 spread. 178.2
Home remedies can cure or prevent the COVID-19. 146.2
True Claims Perplexity
The main way the COVID-19 spreads is through respiratory droplets. 5.8
The most common symptoms of COVID-19 are fever, tiredness, and dry cough. 6.0
The source of SARS-CoV-2, the coronavirus (CoV) causing COVID-19 is unknown. 8.1
Currently, there is no vaccine and no specific antiviral medicine to prevent or treat COVID-19. 8.4
Table 1: Relationship between claims and perplexity. False claims have higher perplexity compared to True claims.
More formally, given a claim c with its correspond-
ing source document D, the task of debunking is
to assigning a label from {True,False} by re-
trieving and utilizing a relevant set of evidence
E = {e1, e2, e3} from D.
Our approach involves three steps in the in-
ference phase: 1) Evidence selection to retrieve
the most relevant evidence from D. 2) Evidence
grounding step to obtain our evidence-primed lan-
guage model (LM Debunker). 3) Debunking step to
obtain perplexity scores from the evidence-primed
LM Debunker and debunking labels.
3.1 Evidence Selection
Given a claim c, our Evidence Selector retrieves
the top-3 relevant evidence E = {e1, e2, e3} in the
following two steps.
Evidence Candidate Selection Given the
source documents D, we select the top-10 most
relevant evidence sentences for each claim.
Depending on the domain of the claim and
source documents, we rely on generic TF-IDF
method to select the tuples of evidence candi-
dates with their corresponding relevancy scores
{(e1, s1), · · · , (e10, s10)}. Note that any evidence
extractor can be used here.
Evidence Filtering After selecting the top can-
didate tuples for the claim c, we attempt to filter
out the noise and unreliable evidence based on the
following rulings:
1) When an evidence candidate is a quote from a
low-credibility speaker such as an Internet meme2
or social-media-post, we discard it (e.g., “quote
according to a social media post.”). Note that this
approach leverages the speaker information inher-
2An idea, image, or video that is spread very quickly on
the internet.
ent in the extracted evidence; 2) If a speaker of
the claim is available, any quote or statement by
the speaker him/herself is inadmissible to the ev-
idence candidate pool; 3) Any evidence identical
to the given claim is considered to be “invalid ev-
idence (i.e. direct quotation of true/false claim);
4) We filter out reciprocal questions, which only
add noise but have no supporting or contradicting
information to the claim from our observation. The
examples of before and after this filtration is shown
in the Appendix.
The final top-3 evidence E is selected after the fil-
tering based on the provided extractor score s. An
example of a claim and its corresponding extracted
evidence are shown in Table 2.
3.2 Grounding LM with Evidence
For the purpose of priming the language model,
all the extracted evidence for a batch of
claims C = {c1, · · · , ck} are aggregated as
E = {e11, e12, e13, · · · , ek1, ek2, ek3}. We obtain
our evidence-grounded language model (LM De-
bunker) by minimizing the following loss L:
L(E) = −
|E|∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
log pθ(x
j
i |xj0, · · · , xji−1), (3)
where the xji denotes a tokens in the evidence e
j ,
and θ the parameters of the language model. It
is important to highlight that none of the debunk-
ing labels or claims are involved in this evidence
grounding step and that our proposed methodology
is model agnostic.
3.3 Debunking with Perplexity
The last step is to obtain debunking labels based
on the perplexity values from the LM Debunker.
As shown in Table 1, perplexity values reveal a
pattern that aligns with our hypothesis regarding
Claim: The main way the COVID-19 spreads is through respiratory droplets. Label: True
Evidence 1: The main mode of COVID-19 transmission is via respiratory droplets, although the
potential of transmission by opportunistic airborne routes via aerosol-generating procedures
in health care facilities, and environmental factors, as in the case of Amoy Gardens, is known.
Evidence 2: The main way that influenza viruses are spread is from person to person via
virus-laden respiratory droplets (particles with size ranging from 0.1 to 100 µm in diameter) that
are generated when infected persons cough or sneeze.
Evidence 3: The respiratory droplets spread can occur only through direct person-to-person
contact or at a close distance.
Table 2: Illustration of evidence extracted using our Evidence Selector
its association with falseness; the false claims have
higher perplexity than the true claims (For more ex-
amples of perplexity values, refer to the Appendix).
Perplexity scores can be translated to debunking
labels by comparing to a perplexity threshold th
that defines the False boundary in the perplexity
space. Any claim with a perplexity score higher
than the threshold is classified as False, and vice
versa for True.
The optimal method of selecting the hyper-
parameter threshold th is an open research ques-
tion. From an application perspective, any value
can serve as a threshold depending on the desired
level of “strictness” towards false claims. We de-
fine “strictness” as the degree of precaution towards
false negative error, which is the most undesirable
form of error in debunking (refer to Section 7 for
details). From an experimental analysis perspec-
tive, a small validation set could be leveraged for
hyper-parameter tuning of the threshold (th). In
this paper, since we have small test sets, we do k-
fold cross-validation (k = 4) to obtain the average
performance reported in Section 6.
4 Dataset
4.1 COVID19 Related Test Sets
Covid19-scientific A new test set is constructed
by collecting COVID-19-related myths and scien-
tific truths labeled by reliable sources like Medi-
calNewsToday, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), and World Health Organization
(WHO). It consists of the most common scientific
or medical myths about COVID-19, which must
be debunked correctly to ensure the safety of the
public (e.g., “drinking a bleach solution will pre-
vent you from getting the COVID-19.”). There
are 142 claims (Table 3) with labels obtained from
the aforementioned reliable sources. According to
WHO and CDC, some myths are unverifiable from
current findings, and we assigned False labels
Test sets Falseclaims
True
claims Total
Covid19-scientific 101 41 142
Covid19-politifact 263 77 340
Table 3: COVID-19 Related Test Set Statistics
to them (e.g., “The coronavirus will die off when
temperatures rise in the spring.”).
Covid19-politifact Another test set is con-
structed by crawling COVID-19-related claims fact-
checked by journalists from a website called Poli-
tifact 3. Unlike the Covid19-scientific test set, it
contains non-scientific and political claims such
as “For the coronavirus, the death rate in Texas,
per capita of 29 million people, we’re one of the
lowest in the country”. Such political claims may
not be life-and-death matters, but they still have
the potential to bring negative sociopolitical effects.
Originally, these claims are labeled into six classes
{pants-fire, false, barely-true, half-true, mostly-
true, true}, which represent the decreasing degree
of fakeness. We use a binary setup for consistency
with our setup for Covid19-scientific by assigning
the first three classes as False and the rest as
True. For detailed data statistics, refer to Table 3.
Gold Source Documents Different gold source
document D are used depending on the domain of
the test sets. For the Covid19-scientific, we use
CORD-19 dataset4, a free open research resource
for combating the COVID-19 pandemic. It is a
resource of over 59,000 scholarly articles, includ-
ing over 47,000 with full text, about COVID-19,
SARS-CoV-2, and other related coronaviruses.
For the Covid19-politifact, we leverage the re-
sources of the Politifact website. When journalists
3https://www.politifact.com/
4https://www.kaggle.com/allen-institute-for-ai/CORD-
19-research-challenge
verify the claims on Politifact, they provide pieces
of text that contain: i) the snippets of relevant infor-
mation from various sources, and ii) a paragraph
of their justification for the verification decisions.
We only take the first part (i) to be our gold source
documents, to avoid using explicit verdicts on test
claims as evidence.
5 Experiments
5.1 Baseline Models
Although unrelated to COVID-19 misinformation,
there are notable state-of-the-art (SOTA) models
and their associated datasets in fact-based misinfor-
mation field.
FEVER (Thorne et al., 2018) Fact Extraction
and Verification (FEVER) is a publicly released
large-scale dataset generated by altering sentences
extracted from Wikipedia to promote research in
fact-checking systems. We use one of the winning
systems from the FEVER workshop5 as our first
baseline model.
• Fever-HexaF (Yoneda et al., 2018b) Given
a claim and a set of evidence, it leverages a
natural language inference model to get entail-
ment scores between claim and each evidence
(se1, se2, ..., sen), and obtains the final predic-
tion label by aggregating the entailment scores
using a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP).
LIAR-Politifact (Wang, 2017) LIAR is a pub-
licly available dataset collected from the Politifact
website, which consists of 12.8k claims. The la-
bel setup is the same as our Covid19-politifact test
set, and the data characteristics are very similar,
but LIAR does not contain any claims related to
COVID-19.
We also report three strong BERT-based (Devlin
et al., 2018) baseline models trained on LIAR data:
• LiarPlusMeta: Our BERT-large-based repli-
cation of SOTA paper from Alhindi et al..
It uses meta-information and “justification,”
human-written reasoning for verification de-
cision in Politifact article, as evidence for the
claim. Our replication is a more robust base-
line, outperforming the reported SOTA accu-
racy by absolute 9% (refer to Appendix for
detailed result table).
5https://fever.ai/2018/task.html. We use the 2nd team be-
cause we had problems running the 1st team’s codebase. Note
that the accuracy between 1st and 2nd is very minimal
• LiarPlus: Similar to LiarPlusMeta model, but
without meta-information. Our replication
also outperforms the SOTA by absolute 8% in
accuracy. This baseline is important because
the focus of this paper is to explore the de-
bunking ability in a data-scarce setting, where
meta-information may not exist.
• LiarOurs: Another BERT-large model fine-
tuned on LIAR-Politifact claims with evi-
dence from our Evidence Selector, instead of
using human-written “justification.”
5.2 Experiment Settings
Out-of-distribution Setting For the Covid19-
scientific test set, all models are tested in the out-
of-distribution (OOD) setting because the test set is
from different distribution compared to all the train
sets used in baseline models; Fever-HexaF model
is trained on FEVER dataset, all other Liar baseline
models are trained on LIAR-Politifact dataset. For
the Covid19-politifact test set, Fever-HexaF model
is again tested in OOD setting. However, all the
Liar-models are not because both their train sets
and the Covid19-politifact test set are from a simi-
lar distribution (Politifact). We use blue highlights
in the Table 4 to indicate models tested in OOD
settings.
Evidence Input for Testing Recalling the task
definition explained in Section 3, we test a claim
with its relevant evidence. To make fair compar-
isons among all baseline models and our LM Den-
bunker, we use the same evidence extracted in the
Evidence Selector step while evaluating the models
on the COVID-19-related test sets.
Language Model Setting For our experiments,
GPT-2 (Wolf et al., 2019) model is selected as our
base language model to build LM Debunker. We
use the pre-trained GPT-2 model (base), with 117
million parameters. Since the COVID-19 pandemic
is a recent event, it is guaranteed that the GPT-2 has
not seen any COVID-19 related information during
its pre-training. Thus, very clean and unbiased
language model to test our hypothesis.
5.3 Experiment Details
We evaluate the performance LM Debunker by
comparing it to other baselines on two commonly
used metrics: accuracy and F1-Macro score. Since
identifying False claims is important in debunk-
ing, we also report F1 of False class (F1-Binary).
Covid19-scientific Covid19-politifact
Models Accuracy F1-Macro F1-Binary Accuracy F1-Macro F1-Binary
Fever-HexaF 64.8% 58.1% 74.8% 46.6% 37.9% 61.2%
LiarPlusMeta 42.3% 41.1% 32.8% 80.3% 66.8% 86.5%
LiarPlus 45.1% 44.8% 44.9% 54.4% 52.8% 61.5%
LiarOurs 61.5% 59.2% 82.8% 78.5% 67.7% 86.4%
LM Debunker 75.4% 69.8% 83.1% 74.4% 58.8% 84.2%
Table 4: Result comparison of our LM Debunker and baselines on two COVID-19 related test sets. Blue highlights
represent the models tested in out-of-distribution setting (i.e., train set and test set are from different distribution).
Note that all accuracy scores are statistically significant (p < 0.05).
Covid19-politifact LiarPlusMeta LiarOurs
Train Size Accuracy F1-Macro F1-Binary Accuracy F1-Macro F1-Binary
0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
10 22.6% 18.5% 0.0% 22.6% 18.5% 0.0%
100 22.6% 18.5% 0.0% 22.6% 18.5% 0.0%
500 73.5% 65.2% 82.2% 64.4% 59.4% 73.6%
1000 72.4% 63.4% 81.5% 70.9% 64.2% 79.7%
10000 (All) 80.3% 66.8% 86.5% 78.5% 67.8% 86.4%
LM Debunker 74.4% 58.8% 84.2% 74.4% 58.8% 84.2%
Table 5: Performance comparison between our LM Debunker and two baseline models trained on varying train set
sizes. LiarPlusMeta and LiarOurs have shown the best performance on Covid-politifact test set in accuracy and
F1-Macro, respectively. Gray highlights represent the first scores that surpass the LM Debunker scores.
Recall that we report average results obtained k-
fold cross-validation. The thresholds used in each
fold are {18, 19, 17, 22} for Covid-politifact and
{15, 24, 17, 20} for Covid-scientific6.
For the evidence grounding step, a learning rate
of 5e-5 was adopted, and different epoch sizes
were explored {1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20}. We reported the
choice with the highest performance in both accu-
racy and F1-Macro. Each trial was run on Nvidia
GTX 1080 Ti, taking 39 seconds per epoch for
Covid-scientific and 113 seconds per epoch for
Covid-politifact.
6 Experimental Results
6.1 Performance of LM Debunker
From Table 4, we can observe that our unsuper-
vised LM debunker portrays notable strength in the
out-of-distribution setting (highlighted with blue)
over other supervised baselines. For the Covid19-
scientific test set, it achieved state-of-the-art results
across all metrics and marginally improved in accu-
6Note that we use k-fold cross-validation to obtain the
average performance, not the average optimal threshold.
racy and F1-binary by an absolute 13.9% ∼ 30.3%
and 10% ∼ 28.7% respectively. Considering
the severe consequences Covid19-scientific myths
could potentially bring, this result is valuable.
For the Covid19-politifact test set, our LM de-
bunker also outperformed Fever-HexaF model and
LiarPlus with a significant margin, but it underper-
formed the LiarOurs model and the LiarPlusMeta
model. Nonetheless, it is still encouraging consid-
ering the fact that these two models were trained
with task-specific supervision on Politifact dataset
(LIAR-Politifact), which is similar to the Covid19-
politifact test set.
The results of LiarPlus and LiarPlusMeta clearly
show the incongruity of the meta-based approach
for cases in which meta-information is not guaran-
teed. LiarPlusMeta struggled to debunk the claims
from the Covid19-scientific test set in contrast to
achieving SOTA in Covid19-politifact test set. This
is because the absence of meta-information for
Covid19-scientific test set hindered LiarPlusMeta
from performing to its maximum capacity. Go-
ing further, the fact that LiarPlusMeta performed
1 2 3 5 10 20
Epochs
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
F1
 M
ac
ro
Figure 2: Trend of highest F1-Macro score over differ-
ent numbers of epochs for evidence grounding
even worse than LiarPlus emphasizes the difficulty
faced by meta-based models in the absence of meta-
information.
FEVER dataset and many FEVER-trained sys-
tems successfully showcased the advancement of
systematic fact-checking. Nevertheless, Fever-
HexaF model exhibited rather low performance
on COVID-19 test sets (10% ∼ 30% behind LM-
debunker in accuracy). One possible justifica-
tion is the way how FEVER data was constructed.
FEVER claims were generated by altering sen-
tences from Wikipedia (e.g., “Hearts is a musi-
cal composition by Minogue”, label: SUPPORTS).
It makes the nature of FEVER-claims have a dis-
crepancy with the naturally occurring myths and
false claims flooding the internet. This implies that
FEVER might not be the most suitable dataset for
training non-wikipedia-based fact-checkers.
6.2 Data Efficiency Comparison
In Table 5, we report the performance of LiarOurs
and LiarPlusMeta classifiers trained on randomly
sampled train sets of differing sizes {10, 100, 500,
1000, 10000}.
As shown by the gray highlights in Table 5,
both classifiers overtake our debunker in F1-Macro
score with 500 labeled training data, but they re-
quire 10000 to outperform on the rest of evalua-
tion metric. Considering the scarcity of labeled
misinformation data for newly emerged events, a
data-efficient debunker is extremely meaningful.
7 Analysis and Discussion
7.1 LM Debunker Behavior Analysis
Number of Epoch for Evidence Grounding
The relationship between the number of epoch in
the evidence grounding step and the debunking
performance is explored. The best performance is
obtained with epoch=5, as shown in Figure 2. We
020406080
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Figure 3: Trend of false negative and false positive
counts over varying threshold.
Covid19-scientific Covid19-politifact
Acc. F1-Macro Acc. F1-Macro
Before 74.6% 56.3% 75.0% 50.6%
After 75.4% 69.8% 74.4% 58.9%
Table 6: Performance comparison between the “before”
and “after” filtering steps in Evidence Selector
believe this is because a low number of epochs does
not allow enough updates to encode the content of
evidence into the language model sufficiently. On
the contrary, a higher number of epochs over-fit the
language model to the given evidence and harms
the generalizability of the language model.
Threshold Perplexity Selection As aforesaid,
the threshold th is controllable to reflect the de-
sired “strictness” of the debunking system. Figure
3 depicts that decreasing the threshold helps to re-
duce the FN errors, which is the most dangerous
form of error. Such controllability over strictness
would be beneficial to the real-world applications,
where the level of “strictness” matters greatly de-
pending on the purpose of the applications.
Meanwhile, FN reduction comes with a trade-
off of increased false positive errors (FP). For a
more balanced debunker, an alternative threshold
choice could be the intersection point of FN and
FP frequencies.
7.2 Evidence Analysis
Our ablation study of the evidence filtering and
cleaning steps (Table 6) shows that improved evi-
dence quality brings big gains in F1-Macro scores
(13.5% and 8.3%) with only 1% loss in accuracy.
Moreover, comparing the performances of LM
Debunker on each of the two test sets, Covid19-
scientific scores surpass Covid19-politifact scores,
especially in F1-Macro, by 11.1%. This is due
to the disparate natures of the gold source doc-
uments used in evidence selection; the Covid19-
scientific claims obtain evidence from scholarly
articles, whereas Covid19-politifact claims extract
evidence from news articles and other unverified
internet sources. Consequently, this resulted in
a different quality of extracted evidence. There-
fore, an important insight would be that evidence
quality is crucial to our approach, and additional
performance gain would be fostered from further
improvement in evidence quality.
7.3 Error analysis and Future Work
We identified areas for improvement in future work
through qualitative analysis of wrongly-predicted
samples from the LM debunker. First, since per-
plexity originally serves as a measure of sentence
likelihood, when a true claim has an abnormal sen-
tence structure, our LM deunker makes a mistake
by assigning high perplexity. For example, a true
claim “So Oscar Helth, the company tapped by
Trump to profit from covid tests, is a Kushner com-
pany. Imagine that, profits over national safety” has
extremely high perplexity. One interesting future
direction would be to explore a way of disentan-
gling “perplexity as a sentence quality measure”
from “perplexity as a falseness indicator”.
Second, our LM debunker makes mistakes when
selected evidence is refuting the False claim by
simply negating the content of the paraphrased
claim. For instance, for a false claim “Taking
ibuprofen worsens symptoms of COVID-19,” the
top most relevant evidence from the scholarly arti-
cles is “there is no current evidence indicating that
ibuprofen worsens the clinical course of COVID-
19.” Another future direction would be to learn a
better way of assigning additional weight/emphasis
on special linguistic features such as negation.
8 Related Work
8.1 Misinformation
Previous approaches (Long et al., 2017; Karimi
et al., 2018; Kirilin and Strube, 2018; Shu et al.,
2018; Monti et al., 2019) show that using meta-
information (e.g. credibility score of the speaker)
with text input helps improve the performance of
misinformation detection. Considering the avail-
ability of meta-information is not always guaran-
teed, building a model independent from it is cru-
cial to detect misinformation. There exist works
with fact-based approaches, using evidence from
external sources for assessing the truthfulness of
information (Etzioni et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2014;
Ciampaglia et al., 2015; Popat et al., 2018; Al-
hindi et al., 2018; Baly et al., 2018; Lee et al.,
2018; Hanselowski et al., 2018). These approaches
based on the logic of “the information is correct if
evidence from credible sources or a group of on-
line sources is supporting it.” Furthermore, some
works focus on reasoning and evidence selecting
ability by restricting the scope of facts to those
from Wikipedia (Thorne et al., 2018; Nie et al.,
2019; Yoneda et al., 2018a)
8.2 Language Model Applications
lead to significant advancements in wide variety
of NLP tasks, including question-answering, com-
monsense reasoning, and semantic relatedness (De-
vlin et al., 2018; Radford et al., 2019; Peters et al.,
2018; Radford et al., 2018). These models are typi-
cally trained on documents mined from Wikipedia
(among other websites). Recently, a number of
works have found that LMs store a surprising
amount of world knowledge, focusing particularly
on the task of open-domain question answering
(Petroni et al., 2019; Roberts et al., 2020). Going
further, Guu et al.; Roberts et al. show that task
specific fine-tuning of LM can achieve impressive
results, proving the power of LMs. In this paper,
we explore to confirm if large pre-trained LM can
also be helpful in the field of debunking.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that misinformation has
high perplexity from the language model primed
with relevant evidence. By proposing the new ap-
plication of perplexity, we build an unsupervised
debunker that shows promising results, especially
in the absence of labeled data. Moreover, we em-
phasize the importance of evidence quality in our
methodology by showing the improvement in the
final performance with the addition of a filtering
step in the evidence selection. We are also releas-
ing two new COVID-19 related test sets publicly
to promote transparency and prevent the spread of
misinformation. Based on this successful leverage
of language model perplexity for debunking, we
hope to foster more research in this new direction.
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Appendix
A Relationship between Claims and Perplexity (PPL)
False Claims PPL
Ordering or buying products shipped from overseas will make a person get COVID-19. 556.2
Sunlight actually can kill the novel COVID-19. 385.0
One should stay at home on particular days when helicopters spray disinfectant over homes for 201.6
killing off COVID-19.
Wearing warm socks and mustard patches as well as spreading goose fat on one’s chest are 200.5
treatments for the COVID-19.
5G helps COVID-19 spread. 178.2
Fish tank additive may treat COVID-19. 151.6
Home remedies can cure or prevent the COVID-19. 146.2
Drinking a lot of water and gargling with warm salt water eliminates the COVID-19 virus. 85.2
Steam your face with and inhale neem can prevent COVID-19. 98.2
Drinking alcohol protect you against COVID-19 and can be dangerous. 69.7
Vitamin D pills could help prevent the COVID-19. 54.7
Ultraviolet disinfection lamp kill the new coronavirus on your hands. 46.1
Taking extra amounts of Vitamin C can prevent COVID-19. 42.0
True Claims PPL
Avoid touching eyes, nose and mouth help prevent COVID-19. 26.5
For COVID-19, other flu-like symptoms such as aches and pains, nasal congestion, runny nose, 24.2
sore throat or diarrhoea are also common.
SARS was more deadly but much less infectious than COVID-19. 21.5
Everyone is at risk of getting COVID-19. 18.0
COVID-19 is different to SARS. 17.8
Antibiotics does not work to kill COVID-19 virus. 17.2
Some people become infected by COVID-19 but don’t develop any symptoms and don’t feel unwell. 10.4
Currently, there is no vaccine and no specific antiviral medicine to prevent or treat COVID-19. 8.4
The source of SARS-CoV-2, the coronavirus (CoV) causing COVID-19 is unknown. 8.1
The incubation period for COVID-19 range from 1 to 14 days. 7.5
People with other health conditions, such as asthma, heart diseases and diabetes, are 6.3
at higher risk of getting seriously ill from COVID-19.
The most common symptoms of COVID-19 are fever, tiredness, and dry cough. 6.0
The main way the COVID-19 spreads is through respiratory droplets. 5.8
COVID-19 spreads from person to person. 3.4
Table A: Extended example to show relationship between claims and perplexity (PPL). False claims have higher perplexity
compared to True claims.
1
B Before vs After Filtering Step
The following examples illustrate different evidence selected to be top-3, before and after the filtering step of our Evidence
Selector. Filtered evidence is the one detected one of policies we mentioned in the Section for Evidence Selection (3.1) and
Replacing Evidence is evidence that comes into top-3 after the filtered evidence gets discarded from the evidence candidate
pool.
Claim: “The coronavirus has made it to Mississippi and the lady that caught it wasn’t
around nobody with it which means it is airborne. That means if the wind blows it
your direction you’ll have it also."
Label: False
Filtered Evidence: More than 5,000 people have shared a Feb. 28 Facebook post,
for example, that warns “the coronavirus has made it to Mississippi."
Replacing Evidence: First of all, as of March 3, it doesn’t appear that there are
any confirmed cases in Mississippi of COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus.
Claim: Says for the coronavirus, “the death rate in Texas, per capita of 29 million people,
we’re one of the lowest in the country."
Label: True
Filtered Evidence: Patrick’s statement also referenced deaths
“per capita of 29 million people" in Texas.’.
Replacing Evidence: Looking at all 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico,
Texas is among the areas with the lowest coronavirus death rate.
Claim: Smokers are likely to be more vulnerable to COVID-19 as the act of smoking
means that fingers are in contact with lips which increases the possibility of
transmission of virus from hand to mouth.
Label: True
Filtered Evidence: Are demographics with high smoking rates more vulnerable to
Covid-19 outbreaks?
Replacing Evidence: However, from their published data we can calculate that the
smokers were 1.4 times more likely (rr=1.4, 95% ci: 0.98-2.00) to have severe
symptoms of COVID-19 and approximately 2.4 times more likely to be admitted to an
icu, need mechanical ventilation or die compared to non-smokers (rr=2.4, 95% ci: 1.43-4.04).’
Table B: Illustration of filtered evidence and following replacing evidence through evidence filtering step.
2
C Performance Comparisons for LIAR-Politifact
Author / Model Name Evidence Meta-data Base Model Binary Class Six Classes
Kirilin no yes LSTM - 45.7%
Alhindi yes no BiLSTM 67.0% 35.0%
Alhindi(Meta) yes yes BiLSTIM 70.0% 36.0%
LiarPlus (Ours) yes no BERT 75.1% 48.1%
LiarPlusMeta (Ours) yes yes BERT 79.4% 49.8%
Table C: The results for LIAR-Politifact for both binary class setup and six classes setup.
3
